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This paper proposes a new method to evaluate the composition of regional arrangements 
focused on increasing intraregional trade and economic integration. In contrast to previous 
studies which take the country composition of these arrangements as given, our method 
uses a network clustering algorithm adapted from the machine learning literature to 
identify, in a data-driven way, those groups of neighboring countries that are most 
integrated with each other. Using the obtained landscape of regional integration clusters 
(RICs) as benchmark, we then apply our method to critically assess the composition of 
real-world customs unions. Our results indicate that there is considerable variation across 
customs unions as to their distance to the RICs emerging from the clustering algorithm, 
suggesting that some customs unions are relatively more driven by ‘natural’ economic 
forces, as opposed to political considerations. Our results also point to several testable 
hypotheses related to the geopolitical configuration of customs unions. 
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A growing body of literature measures and compares regional economic integration outcomes 
across regions and subregions of the world.1 A common problem in comparing the results 
presented in different studies in this literature is that the underlying classifications (i.e., 
groupings) of countries into regions and subregions vary widely across studies. 2  This is 
particularly problematic because the quantitative measures of regional integration used in these 
studies tend to be very sensitive to the size and composition of the underlying country 
groupings (De Lombaerde et al., 2010; Hamanaka, 2015). In addition, individual country scores 
on regional integration indicators critically depend on the ex ante defined regions. Countries 
can be peripheral in one region, but central in another. It is, in general, thus unclear to what 
extent the findings in this literature represent general results or to what extent they are driven 
by differences in the underlying country groupings. Moreover, this issue is further exacerbated 
by the fact that it is usually not possible to quantify the robustness of results with respect to 
alternative country groupings as (i) there exists no standard classification of regions and 
subregions in the economic literature that could be used as a benchmark grouping, and (ii) the 
number of possible alternative groupings that would need to be considered in the absence of 
such a benchmark is usually too large to allow for a comprehensive assessment of the 
robustness of the results obtained based on any given grouping. 
This paper addresses this gap in the literature by proposing a new method to identify, in a 
data-driven way, those groups of (bordering) countries that are most integrated with each other, 
essentially endogenizing the choice about which region a country belongs to in terms of 
economic integration. Our proposed method is based on a network clustering algorithm 
commonly used in machine learning, which we adapt to be used with data on economic flows 
between countries. The resulting landscape of country groups, which we call regional 
integration clusters (RICs), captures the empirical structure of regional economic linkages in 
the data. As we demonstrate below, the RICs provide a useful benchmark for assessing the 
composition of regional arrangements, such as customs unions and regional trade agreements, 
focused on increasing intraregional trade and economic integration among a set of neighboring 
countries. 
Of course, which regional grouping is the “correct” one to use depends on the specific 
application at hand. For example, if a regional development bank is interested in assessing how 
integrated its member states are compared to countries in other parts of the world, then it seems 
natural to use the regional classification also underlying the bank’s overall strategy framework 
	
1 Besides the large literature on trade integration, many recent studies measure economic integration using a 
composite index which aggregates multiple indicators of economic integration such as trade, migration, 
foreign direct investment, and other cross-border links (De Lombaerde et al., 2008; AfDB, 2016; Rayp and 
Standaert, 2017; Huh and Park, 2018; Naeher and Narayanan, 2020; UNESCAP, 2020).  
2 For example, each of the studies cited in footnote 1 uses a different classification of regions. 
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(e.g., based on membership status). The questions we are addressing, however, are of a more 
general type and relate to the ‘natural’ grouping of countries into regions in terms of empirical 
cross-border economic relations. Specifically, assuming we wanted to map each country to 
exactly one region, what are the sizes and composition of groups of neighboring countries that 
best reflect the structure of regional economic linkages in the data for any given measure of 
regional integration and number of regions? We provide an answer to these questions by 
defining a measure to quantify how well a complete mapping of countries into regions (i.e., 
each country is mapped to exactly one region) matches the landscape of regional economic 
linkages in the data, and then solving for the mapping that yields the maximum match. In doing 
so, we focus on regional integration in terms of actual economic flows (i.e., actual economic 
integration as defined in Mongelli et al., 2005) rather than institutional or cultural integration. 
Our results are neutral in the sense that they do not rely on any specific theory of regional 
integration, nor do they by themselves provide insights on the potential benefits of economic 
integration to growth or welfare. Put simply, we measure the concentrations of cross-border 
economic activity among neighboring countries and then apply a network clustering algorithm 
that regionalizes the global network of countries into regional clusters matching the structure 
of the observed integration concentrations in the data. 
The intuition behind our algorithm can be described as follows. Starting with an initial list 
of all countries, where each country constitutes its own “region”, the algorithm iteratively 
merges those pairs of bordering regions that are associated with the largest integration scores 
(according to some measure of regional economic integration, e.g., intraregional trade shares) 
among all possible pairs of bordering regions. The outcome after s steps, i.e., s times merging 
two regions, is a set of endogenously determined regional clusters (the RICs) capturing the 
structure of regional economic linkages in the data. The RICs can therefore be thought of as a 
hypothetical benchmark grouping representing those groups of countries that are most 
integrated with each other according to the considered measure of regional integration. With 
such a benchmark at hand, several interesting questions can be addressed. Most importantly, 
using the RICs as a benchmark offers a way to evaluate how adequate regional arrangements 
are from an economic perspective, e.g., how much real-world customs unions or free trade 
areas are aligned with empirical trade intensities among the participating countries. For 
example, if one finds that the participating countries in such an arrangement do in fact benefit 
relatively little because they trade only little among each other, then this might give rise to the 
perception that other factors, such as political considerations, must be driving the arrangement. 
In addition, our results also provide insights about which economic block individual 
countries belong to in terms of actual economic integration. There are several ways in which 
these insights can be useful. First, national policymakers often face choices about which 
regional economic arrangement (e.g., customs union) their country should join (and which not). 
If there are benefits from regional economic integration (Baldwin and Venables, 1995; 
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Henrekson et al., 1997; Fernández and Portes, 1998; Te Velde, 2011), and joining a group of 
countries with stronger economic ties is associated with larger benefits than joining a group of 
countries with weaker economic ties, then the optimal choices will depend on how much in line 
the composition of each group is with the empirical integration intensities, i.e., to what extent 
the countries forming such a regional arrangement are indeed economically interlinked with 
each other. Our analysis thus provides insights on an important factor in this context which can 
help to guide decision making. Similarly, our results may be useful for policymakers in member 
states of regional arrangements who have to decide whether to let a non-member country join 
their arrangement, or which of multiple countries interested in joining they should prioritize. 
In these contexts, economists would often analyze individual countries’ largest trading partners 
to help guide decision making. Our proposed method facilitates a similar type of analysis but 
focusing on linkages at the regional level (between multiple countries) rather than bilateral 
links (between pairs of countries). Our method is therefore particularly suited to address 
questions related to the regional structure of economic integration, e.g., questions like “Is the 
Turkish economy rather part of an Asian economic block or of an European economic block?”, 
“Do the economies of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) form a cohesive 
group or are some of them more strongly tied to the Chinese economy?”, and “Would South 
Sudan gain more from joining the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa 
(CEMAC) or from joining the East African Community (EAC)?” 
To demonstrate the intuition and usefulness of the proposed approach, we apply our 
method to assess the composition of real-world customs unions (CUs). The results indicate that 
existing CUs differ considerably in their relative distance to the RICs that emerge from the 
clustering algorithm. The relative distance scores can be interpreted as indicators of the 
‘natural’ or otherwise ‘political’ nature of each customs union. Our results also point to a 
number of testable hypotheses related to the geopolitical configuration of customs unions. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related literature, 
including further background on customs unions. Section 3 provides a formal definition of the 
problem we solve. Section 4 presents our proposed algorithm for identifying regional 
integration clusters in a data-driven way and explains how it can be implemented using real-
world data. Section 5 applies the method to evaluate the composition of existing customs 
unions. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2 Related Work 
Our paper speaks to the international economics literature where the idea of optimal extensions 
of regional arrangements has been suggested. This idea of optimality of regional areas can be 
understood as a special case of the search for an optimal level of government intervention in 
the economy for the provision of public goods (Tinbergen, 1965; Kindleberger, 1986; Cooper, 
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1995). Optimum currency areas (OCA) are an obvious and obligatory reference point. In 
Mundell’s seminal paper (Mundell, 1961) and the OCA theory which was consequently 
developed, the sterile debate on fixed versus flexible exchange rates was questioned and the 
idea was brought to the fore that ‘optimal’ sizes exist for regional groupings within which it is 
welfare superior to adopt fixed exchange rates, while maintaining flexible rates with the rest of 
the world. The size of the OCA can be determined by different (combinations of) criteria, 
including factor mobility (Mundell, 1961), openness (McKinnon, 1963), diversification of 
productive structures (Kenen, 1969) or trade intensity and correlation of business cycles. The 
complementarity between monetary integration and trade integration was analyzed by Méndez-
Naya (1997). 
In customs union theory, it is well known that the welfare effects of creating such unions 
depend on the relative importance of trade creation and trade diversion (Viner, 1950), whereby 
the net effect can theoretically be negative. Even if multilateral trade liberalization is optimal 
according to neo-classical orthodoxy, customs union theory provides a criterion to compare 
customs unions mutually on the basis of their relative welfare effects. In a trade policy context, 
the concept of ‘natural markets’ has emerged. A ‘natural market’ is defined then as a (regional) 
market characterized by net trade creation, i.e., by a net welfare increasing effect (Jacquemin 
and Sapir, 1991; Krugman, 1991). The suggested linkage between trade intensity and 
optimality in this approach is directly relevant for our purposes. Again, various criteria have 
been proposed, however, to determine the optimality of such markets. Whereas Krugman 
(1991) proposes a criterion based on the level of ex ante trade flows, Kreinin and Plummer 
(1994) propose a criterion based on trade patterns and ex ante trade distortions. Evaluations of 
free trade areas or customs unions in terms of whether they can be considered as ‘natural’ or 
not, depend highly on the underlying model (Nitsch, 1997; Frankel et al., 1998). A 
methodological problem that has been signaled in this context is the endogeneity problem 
(Frankel and Rose, 1998). Ex ante measures are not necessarily conclusive to evaluate the 
optimality conditions of a ‘region’. These conditions can be met ex post. 
Our paper also relates to the literature applying network analysis techniques to trade flows, 
and more specifically the literature that applies community-detection techniques to the global 
trade network to identify clusters of intensely trading countries (Fortunato, 2010; Barigozzi et 
al., 2011; Piccardi and Tajoli, 2015). However, the demarcation of these clusters is often not 
statistically significant as extra-regional ties are usually relatively important (Piccardi and 
Tajoli, 2012). It is also found that the identified clusters do not necessarily overlap very well 
with the country groupings bound together by trade agreements (De Lombaerde et al., 2018). 
This echoes the fact that the empirical trade literature, mostly based on gravity-type 
estimations, tends not to find clear evidence of the trade effect of preferential trade agreements. 
At best, small (and not always significant) positive effects are found (Cardamone, 2007; Baier 
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and Bergstrand, 2009; Cipollina and Salvatici, 2010; Nguyen, 2019). And studies that focus on 
specific trade agreements tend to show even lower trade effects (Mordonu et al., 2011). 
 
3 Problem Definition 
Consider a set of countries 𝐶 = {𝑐!, 𝑐", . . , 𝑐#} and their set of borders 𝐵, with 𝑏$,& ∈ 𝐵 being 
the border for any two bordering countries 𝑐$ and 𝑐& in 𝐶".3 A region 𝑟 is defined as a set of 
bordering countries. For ease of exposition, we consider every country 𝑐$ ∈ 𝐶 to be its own 
region 𝑟{(!} (i.e., a region containing only a single country). Whenever two regions 𝑟* and 𝑟+ 
are merged with each other, they form a new region 𝑟*∪- comprising all countries in 𝑟* and 𝑟+. 
Throughout this paper, we only consider the possibility of regions to be merged if they border 
each other. Two regions 𝑟* and 𝑟+ are bordering each other if there exists at least one country 
𝑐$ ∈ 𝑟* which shares a border with at least one country 𝑐& ∈ 𝑟+. 
A grouping 𝑅 is defined as a set of regions. Let 𝑅. be the set of all regions at step 𝑠, where 
a step corresponds to the merging of two regions. Initially, each country forms its own region, 
so that 𝑅/ is given by 
 𝑅/ = .𝑟{(!}, ∀	𝑐$ ∈ 𝐶1 (1) 
Starting with some grouping 𝑅., merging two regions 𝑟* ∈ 𝑅. and 𝑟+ ∈ 𝑅. means that 𝑟* and 
𝑟+ are removed from 𝑅. and replaced by a new region 𝑟*∪-. Thus, the set of regions in the next 
step, 𝑅.0!, will contain one element less than 𝑅. (namely all the regions in 𝑅. except 𝑟* and 
𝑟+, and adding 𝑟*∪-). Notice that this ensures that 𝑅. provides a complete grouping of countries 
into regions, i.e., every country in 𝐶 is part of exactly one region at every step. 
Every region 𝑟1  is associated with an integration score 𝑆(𝑟1)  (except single-country 
regions). In principle, 𝑆(𝑟1)  may be any quantitative measure of regional integration. For 
example, in the application we discuss below, 𝑆(𝑟1) is the intraregional trade share (normalized 
by the product of GDPs)4 given by 
 𝑆(𝑟1) =
∑ 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒((!,(")#$!,$"%∈&',$!)$"
3∑ ∑ 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒((!,(")$"∈𝐶$!∈&' 4∙3∏ 𝐺𝐷𝑃((!)$!∈&' 4
 (2) 
where 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒(𝑐$ , 𝑐&)  is the sum of exports and imports between countries 𝑐$  and 𝑐& , and 
𝐺𝐷𝑃(𝑐$) is country 𝑐$’s gross domestic product. 
	
3 We consider borders to be symmetric, i.e., 𝑏*,+ ∈ 𝐵 ⟹ 𝑏+,* ∈ 𝐵, ∀	(𝑐* , 𝑐+) ∈ 𝐶,. 
4 The product of GDPs was chosen, rather than the sum of GDPs, because it reflects better the trade potential, 
especially in cases of asymmetric trade partners. 
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Research questions. We are interested in (i) identifying those groups of bordering countries 
that are most integrated with each other, and (ii) obtaining a quantitative measure of how well 
a given grouping 𝑅6  matches the empirical structure of regional economic linkages in the data, 
i.e., to what extent the regions in 𝑅6 comprise countries that are strongly integrated with each 
other. More specifically, we want to quantify the degree to which the regions in 𝑅6 overlap 
with the regions in another grouping 𝑅∗, where 𝑅∗ is the grouping of countries into regions that 
maximizes overall regional integration according to some objective function 𝐹(𝑆(𝑟1), 𝐵). 
 
4 Proposed Method: Identifying Regional Integration 
Clusters in a Data-Driven Way 
Based on the definitions above, a possible approach to answering our research questions would 
be to (i) specify an objective function 𝐹(·) and a measure of regional integration 𝑆(𝑟1), (ii) 
write down the problem as a constraint optimization problem with the real-world borders 
between countries as 𝐵 and data on the factors included in 𝑆(𝑟1) (e.g., the economic indicators 
used in equation 2) as parameter values, and then (iii) solve for the grouping of countries into 
regions 𝑅∗ that maximizes the objective subject to the constraints. 
However, rather than explicitly specifying 𝐹(·) and computing 𝑅∗ directly, we propose a 
different approach here. Specifically, we propose to obtain 𝑅∗ by identifying those groups of 
bordering countries that are most integrated with each other using a network clustering 
algorithm commonly applied in machine learning. There are two main advantages to this 
approach. First, specifying an objective based on which 𝑅∗ is to be calculated would require us 
to make choices about the functional form and parameterization of the objective. To the best of 
our knowledge, these choices would have to be ad-hoc, i.e., there is no theory or empirical 
evidence that could be used to guide these choices. As we show below, using a machine 
learning approach to compute 𝑅∗ allows us to avoid having to make these choices. Second, 
even for a simple objective function (e.g., maximizing the sum of 𝑆(𝑟1) across all regions 𝑟1), 
solving for the optimal grouping 𝑅∗ would be very computationally demanding and, for most 






5 For example, in the map of the world that is used in our experiments (containing 200 countries and their 
respective land and maritime borders), there are 485, 2k+, 11k+, and 100k+ possible regions of size 2, 3, 4, and 
5 respectively, and this number is growing exponentially with the increase in region size. Thus, the number 
of possible groupings that would have to be calculated to solve for the grouping with the maximum regional 
integration score is too large. 
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Figure 1: Clustering Algorithm 
 
Input: 𝑅, 𝐵, Imports, Exports, GDPs, Stopping Criteria 
Output: 𝑅 
1: while Stopping Criteria Not Met do 
 2: BestMerge ← (𝜑, 𝜑) 
 3: BestS ← 0 
 4: for (𝑟*, 𝑟+) ∈ 𝑅" do 
 5: if 𝐴 ≠ 𝐵 and ∃B𝑐$ , 𝑐&C ∈ 𝐴 × 𝐵	|	𝑏$,& ∈ B then 
 6: if 𝑆(𝑟*∪+) > BestS then 
 7: BestMerge ← (𝑟*, 𝑟+) 
 8: BestS ← 𝑆(𝑟*∪+) 
 9: end if 
 10: end if 
 11: end for 
 12: if BestS > 0 then 
 13: 𝑅 ← 𝑅\{𝑟BestMerge[1], 𝑟BestMerge[2]} 
 14: 𝑅 ← 𝑅 ∪ {𝑟BestMerge[1]∪BestMerge[2]} 
 15: end if 
16: end while 
 
 
Algorithm. Figure 1 describes the algorithm we propose for computing 𝑅∗. For a given initial 
list of regions, the algorithm literately finds the best two bordering regions to merge (based on 
their regional integration score 𝑆(𝑟1)) until a set of stopping criteria are met (in our case, the 
stopping criterion consists of the absence of unmerged bordering regions).6 The key idea behind 
the algorithm is that 𝑅∗ can be obtained in a data-driven way by starting with 𝑅/ as defined in 
equation (1), and then subsequently merging those pairs of bordering regions that are associated 
with the largest regional integration scores among all remaining pairs of bordering regions. 
More specifically, starting with 𝑅/ (i.e., every country forms its own region) the algorithm 
calculates the regional integration scores 𝑆(𝑟1) resulting from merging any pair of bordering 
countries in 𝑅/, and then selects the pair featuring the highest score. In the second step, the 
algorithm repeats the same procedure starting with the grouping 𝑅!∗ , which is obtained by 
merging the two countries selected in the previous step. Iteratively, the algorithm then merges 
pairs of bordering countries (or clusters of multiple bordering countries), reducing the total 
	
6 Note that in any case, these stopping criteria have to subsume the case where there are no more bordering 
regions in 𝑅∗ able to merge. 
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number of regions contained in 𝑅∗ by one in each step. The outcome after 𝑠 steps (i.e., 𝑠 times 
merging two regions) is a set of endogenously determined regional clusters capturing those 
groups of bordering countries that are most integrated with each other. We therefore call the 
resulting country groups in 𝑅.∗ regional integration clusters (RICs). 
 
 
Figure 2: Tree Graph Showing Results of the Clustering Algorithm 
 
Note: Results are based on the clustering algorithm defined in Figure 1 using the regional integration scores 
𝑆(𝑟.) defined in equation (2) and the data sources described in Section 5. Borders include both land and 






Figure 2 provides an illustration of the results generated by the clustering algorithm. The 
set of borders underlying these results contains both land and maritime borders, and the regional 
integration scores 𝑆(𝑟1)  are calculated as defined in equation (2) using the data sources 
described in Section 5. In the graph shown in Figure 2, the set of nodes at the outer end (which 
feature only a single edge) correspond to 𝑅/, i.e., the set of individual countries. The numbers 
shown on the interior nodes of the graph (those featuring two or more edges) are the steps at 
which the corresponding clusters get merged. Intuitively, nodes closer to the center of the graph 
correspond to later steps of the algorithm. 
In principle, the graph in Figure 2 contains the information about the country groups in 𝑅.∗ 
at all steps. In particular, the RICs at a particular step 𝑠 can be obtained as the (disconnected) 
subgraph resulting from dropping all nodes in Figure 2 higher than 𝑠. Some examples of the 
landscape of RICs associated with individual steps are shown in Figure 3. Specifically, the four 
colored world maps shown in Figure 3 visualize the landscapes of RICs obtained at step 50, 
85, 190, and 198 of the clustering algorithm as indicated in the figure. Each color represents a 
cluster of merged countries, while countries in white have not yet been merged at the respective 
step. 
Notice that at step 50 in Figure 3, only a small subset of countries have been merged with 
others, and most of the countries which get merged early on are in Sub-Saharan Africa. This 
reflects the fact that the underlying measure 𝑆(𝑟1) of regional integration (i.e., the intraregional 
trade shares defined in equation 2) essentially captures a bias towards intraregional trade as 
opposed to global trade with countries located in other parts of world. As many countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa trade only relatively little with the rest of the world, and the bit of 
international trade they have takes place mostly with their immediate neighbors, 𝑆(𝑟1) takes 
large values for these countries. The same intuition applies, in reverse direction, to the 
landscape of RICs at step 85 in Figure 3. The few countries that still form their own clusters at 
this step (those in white, e.g., China, Germany, and the U.S.) are countries which trade heavily 
at a global scale, i.e., including with countries other than their immediate neighbors. At step 
190, the landscape of RICs shown in Figure 3 comprises 10 clusters, and all 200 countries in 
our dataset have been merged with at least one other country. The last colored world map in 
Figure 3 corresponds to the pre-final step (198) of the algorithm before its termination, which 
features a bipolar landscape consisting of two large clusters which together comprise all 
countries. 
As the results for selected steps of the algorithm in Figure 3 illustrate, the clustering 
algorithm defined in Figure 1 generates groups of countries that represent the structure of 
regional economic linkages in the data, i.e., that, for each possible number of clusters, capture 
the sizes and compositions of those groups of neighboring countries which are most integrated 
with each other. The RICs therefore provide an answer to our first research question defined in 
Section 3. To answer our second research question, we use the RICs as the benchmark grouping 
10 
𝑅∗ and define a distance function (metric) that allows us to quantify the degree to which the 
regions in 𝑅∗ overlap with the regions in any other grouping 𝑅6. Specifically, we define the 
distance between two regions 𝑟* ∈ 𝑅6 and 𝑟*∗ ∈ 𝑅∗ as 
 𝑑(𝑟𝐴, 𝑟𝐴∗ ) = |𝑟𝐴\𝑟𝐴∗ |+ |𝑟𝐴∗ \𝑟𝐴|, (3) 
where |𝑥| is the number of elements (countries) in region 𝑥, and "\" denotes the set subtraction 
operator (recall that each region is defined as a set of countries). In other words, the distance 
between two regions equals the number of countries that need to be removed plus the number 
of countries that need to be added from one of the regions to convert it into the other region. 
For example, if the distance between regions 𝑟* ∈ 𝑅6 and 𝑟*∗ ∈ 𝑅∗ is smaller than the distance 
between 𝑟+ ∈ 𝑅6 and 𝑟+∗ ∈ 𝑅∗, then we will conclude that the composition of 𝑟* matches the 
regional economic linkages in the data better than the composition of 𝑟+. Note that the range 
of 𝑑(𝑟𝐴, 𝑟𝐴∗ ) is [0, |𝑟*| + |𝑟*∗|]. Since this distance function depends on the size of 𝑟*, we also 
report results for a normalized distance measure obtained by dividing 𝑑(𝑟𝐴, 𝑟𝐴∗ ) by |𝑟*|, so that 















Note: Different colors represent different regional integration clusters (RICs) comprising at least two countries at a 
given step. Re (2) and the data sources described in Section 5. Borders include both land and maritime borders (for a 





Recall that the clustering algorithm defined in Figure 1 yields a different grouping of 
countries into regions at each step (corresponding to groupings with different numbers of 
regions). When calculating the distance between a region 𝑟* ∈ 𝑅6  and the corresponding 
benchmark region 𝑟*∗ ∈ 𝑅∗, the choice of 𝑟*∗ thus involves two decisions. First, at which step of 
the algorithm 𝑟*∗ is obtained, i.e., the choice of 𝑅.∗, and second which particular region within 
𝑅.∗ is used as the benchmark for 𝑟*. Rather than making these choices ourselves, we endogenize 
both choices by using the region with the minimum distance to 𝑟* out of all regions in 𝑅.∗ across 
all steps, i.e., 
 𝑟*∗ = arg min<∗∈?∗ 𝑑(𝑟
∗, 𝑟*) (4) 
with 𝑅∗ = ⋃ 𝑅$∗#$@/ , and 𝑛 being the total number of steps in our algorithm. Note that this 
implies that the maximum possible distance between a region 𝑟*  and its corresponding 
benchmark RIC 𝑟*∗ will be |𝑟*| − 1.7 
Given that this choice of 𝑟*∗ leads to the minimum possible distance between 𝑟*  and any 
element of 𝑅∗, the results can be interpreted as providing a lower bound estimate for how 
adequate the composition of 𝑟*  is from an empirical perspective. For example, if we find that 
x% of the countries in a real-world customs union 𝑟*  are not included in the corresponding 
benchmark RIC 𝑟*∗ obtained according to equation (4), then this suggests that at least x% of the 
countries in 𝑟* could gain economically from being part of a different customs union than 𝑟*.8 
 
5 Application to Customs Unions 
We now present an application of our method to customs unions (CUs). Contrary to free trade 
agreements (FTAs), these are, in principle, not overlapping and they are small in numbers. This 
contrasts with most of the empirical literature on trade effects of regional trade agreements 
which focuses on FTAs. In addition, much of the discussion on ‘natural markets’ deals with 
continental trade areas (Frankel et al., 1998). Customs unions are defined in paragraph 8(a) of 
Article XXIV of GATT 1994 as “[...] the substitution of a single customs territory for two or 
more customs territories, so that (i) duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce 
(except, where necessary, those permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX) are 
eliminated with respect to substantially all the trade between the constituent territories of the 
union or at least with respect to substantially all the trade in products originating in such 
territories, and (ii) subject to the provisions of paragraph 9, substantially the same duties and 
	
7 As 𝑅∗ includes all the single country regions in 𝑅0∗, any 𝑟𝐴 will feature a RIC with a distance no greater than 
|𝑟𝐴| − 1 (i.e., if the RIC closest to 𝑟𝐴 consists of a single member country of 𝑟𝐴). 
8 The results also represent lower bound estimates for a second reason. Due to the endogeneity of the optimality 
criterion used (see also the discussion in Section 2), which is based on intraregional trade intensity, existing 
arrangements between neighboring states (such as the customs unions studied in Section 5) will tend to show 
higher scores than alternative country groupings which have not benefited from the trade creating effect of 
being in a customs union. 
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other regulations of commerce are applied by each of the members of the union to the trade of 
territories not included in the union.” 
We include in our analysis the CUs that are notified to the WTO and currently (as of 
October 2020) in force. A list of the included CUs is contained in Table 1 (column 1), while 
their composition can be seen in column 2. Note that this list differs slightly from the longer 
list of notified customs unions in the WTO database for the following reasons: 
- Our list does not include accessions separately as they collapse with the CU to which 
they refer. 
- We do not include the EU-Andorra CU (entry into force: 01/07/1991) and the EU-San 
Marino CU (entry into force: 01/04/2002). 
- COMESA is not included because, although its CU was formally notified to the WTO 
in 1995 under the enabling clause, it is still not operational.9 
- The Russian Federation-Belarus-Kazakhstan CU (entry into force: 03/12/1997) is not 
included as it was absorbed by the EAEU. 
- The West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) is not included as all its 
members are also part of ECOWAS. 
- The EU-Turkey CU is not included as it is only a partial agreement, covering only 
industrial goods, and without a coherent common external tariff (De Lombaerde and 
Ulyanov, 2020). 
Also note that our analysis still refers to the EU-28. The UK was a Member State of the 
EU until January 2020, but the Withdrawal Agreement provided for a transition period during 
which the UK continues to be considered as a EU Member State for the purposes of relevant 
international agreements, including the customs union. Our analysis refers further to Mercosur-
4. An accession protocol was signed between MERCOSUR member states and Venezuela in 
2006, and the latter country became a full member in 2013. However, it was suspended in 2016. 
In total, this gives us a set of 11 CUs. To assess the extent to which these CUs are ‘natural’ 
(i.e., in line with the empirical integration intensities, and opposed to being driven by other 
factors such as political considerations), we compare the composition of each CU to the 
landscape of RICs emerging from the clustering algorithm as described in Section 4. The 
underlying data on trade flows come from the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) 
database. Data on GDP (used for normalizing) come from the World Bank and are measured 
in current US-dollars. To limit the role of temporary fluctuations and measurement error, the 
analysis is based on 5-year average values for all variables, corresponding to the period 2014-
2018. 
	
9 See www.uneca.org/oria/pages/comesa-trade-and-market-integration (last accessed in October 2020). 
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Figure 4: Maps Showing Customs Unions and RICs 
Customs Unions
 
RICs at Step 180 
 
Notes: Different colors represent different customs unions (left map) and regional integration clusters (RIC; right 
map). Results for the RICs are based on the clustering algorithm defined in Figure 1 using the regional integration 
scores S(rk) defined in equation (2) and the data sources described in Section 5. Borders include both land and 
maritime borders (for a complete list of borders, see Figure A1 in the Appendix). 
 
 
To provide a first impression of the landscape of CUs we are working with, Figure 4 shows 
a map of the country groups forming the CUs as well as a map showing the landscape of RICs 
at step 180 of the algorithm. Importantly, it should be noted that this step only serves as an 
example featuring RICs of similar sizes than the CUs, on average. As discussed in more detail 
below, the RICs with the minimum distance to the CUs which will be used as benchmarks are 
in fact obtained at different steps for different CUs (and thus cannot be depicted in a single 
map). 
The main results emerging from our analysis are reported in columns (3) to (7) in Table 
1. Column (3) shows the minimum distance between the CU and the respective benchmark 
RIC. Column (4) shows the corresponding normalized distance, i.e., when dividing the distance 
in column (3) by the number of countries in the CU (shown in column 2). Column (5) reports 
the step of the algorithm at which the minimum distance is (first) reached.10 Column (6) shows, 
on the one hand, the CU members that are part of the RIC with minimum distance, and, on the 
other hand, the (posterior) steps at which the other CU members become part of the same RIC. 
In addition, it is possible that the RIC with minimum distance (at the step when the minimum 
distance is first reached) contains countries which are not members of the corresponding CU. 





10 Note that, once the minimum distance has been reached in the algorithm, the composition of the RIC can stay 
constant during a number of steps until a new member is added. In addition, our algorithm has the feature that 
the minimum distance can be reached both in different steps and with different configurations. For example, 
if in a given step two countries are added to a RIC where one country is also a CU member and the other is a 
third country, then the distance between the RIC and the corresponding CU remains the same. If, on the other 
hand, this happened in consecutive steps (e.g., first the third country is added, then the CU member), then the 
distance would first go up and then down again (this case seems to be a theoretical possibility which does not 
occur in our data). 
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in RIC with 
Min. Dist. 




Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, 
Peru (4) 
2 0.5 64 Ecuador (64), Peru (64), Bolivia (181), 
Colombia (192) 






Antigua and Barbuda, 
Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, 
Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, 
Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat 
(not included), Saint Kitts 
and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint 
Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Suriname, Trinidad and 
Tobago (14) 
6 0.43 170 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (5), Grenada 
(5), Trinidad and Tobago (70), Barbados (101), 
Guyana (101), Saint Lucia (101), Suriname 
(101), Antigua and Barbuda (170), Dominica 
(170), Saint Kitts and Nevis (170), Haiti (183), 







El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Nicaragua, Honduras, Costa 
Rica, Panama (6) 
4 0.67 25 El Salvador (25), Nicaragua (25), Costa Rica 
(119), Panama (119), Guatemala (136), 
Honduras (192) 




Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, 
Burundi, Rwanda (5) 
3 0.6 18 Burundi (18), Rwanda (18), Uganda (113), 
Kenya (152), Tanzania (181) 
  - 
European 
Community (EC) 
Belgium, France, Germany, 
Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Denmark, 
Ireland, UK, Greece, 
Portugal, Spain, Austria, 
Finland, Sweden, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Poland, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, Bulgaria, 
Romania, Croatia (28) 
16 0.57 186 Czech Republic (129), Slovak Republic (129), 
Austria (141), Hungary (141), France (171), 
Germany (171), Netherlands (171), Spain 
(171), Denmark (186), Estonia (186), Finland 
(186), Latvia (186), Lithuania (186), Sweden 
(186), Belgium (194), Bulgaria (194), Ireland 
(194), Luxembourg (194), Poland (194), 
Romania (194), UK (194), Croatia (199), 
Cyprus (199), Greece (199), Italy (199), Malta 








Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Congo, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon (6) 
3 0.5 133 Cameroon (117), Equatorial Guinea (117), 
Congo (133), Gabon (133), Central African 








Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo 
Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, The 
Gambia, Togo (15) 
8 0.53 150 Guinea (108), Guinea-Bissau (108), Liberia 
(108), Sierra Leone (108), Cabo Verde (150), 
The Gambia (150), Senegal (150), Côte 
d'Ivoire (178), Ghana (178), Mali (178), Benin 
(189), Burkina Faso (189), Niger (189), Nigeria 
(189), Togo (189) 




Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russian 
Federation, Armenia, Kyrgyz 
Republic (5) 
4 0.8 0 Kazakhstan (148), Russian Federation (148), 
Belarus (194), Armenia (199), Kyrgyz 
Republic (199) 
  - 
Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) 
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United 
Arab Emirates (6) 
3 0.5 110 Oman (63), United Arab Emirates (63), Qatar 
(110), Bahrain (187), 
Kuwait (187), Saudi Arabia (187) 





Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, 
Namibia, South Africa (5) 
3 0.6 14 Botswana (14), Namibia (14), Lesotho (157), 
South Africa (157), Eswatini (194) 




Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, 
Uruguay (4) 
1 0.25 120 Argentina (68), Uruguay (68), Brazil (120), 
Paraguay (158) 




To illustrate how the results in Table 1 can be interpreted, consider the case of 
MERCOSUR as an example. This CU has four members (column 2) and the minimum distance 
to its benchmark RIC is reached in step 120 (column 5). In this step, three of the CU members 
(Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil; see column 6) are part of the RIC, whereas Paraguay is only 
added later (in step 158). Also, there are no other countries in the benchmark RIC at step 120 
(see column 7). Therefore, the distance is 1 (i.e., one country must be added to form 
MERCOSUR), and the normalized distance is 0.25 (1/4). Note that the result that the minimum 
distance is not reached at step 158, when Paraguay is also part of the RIC, is due to the fact that 
other countries (not members of MERCOSUR) join the RIC consisting of Argentina, Uruguay, 
and Brazil before step 158 is reached (these countries are not reported here). Also note that, 
due to the endogeneity of the optimality criterion used (recall the discussion in Section 4), our 
method tends to underestimate the minimum distance between CUs and RICs, so that the results 
should be interpreted as providing lower bound estimates of how ‘natural’ the CUs are. 
Our results allow for an analysis at two levels: inter-block comparisons and intrablock 
case studies. As far as inter-block comparisons are concerned, normalized minimum distances 
range from 0.25 (MERCOSUR) to 0.8 (EAEU). The latter is actually the maximum distance 
possible. These results can be used as an indicator of how ‘natural’ (or, on the contrary, how 
‘political’) each customs union appears to be. Whereas MERCOSUR emerges almost naturally 
from the trade intensities observed in the data, this is much less the case for the EAEU. In other 
words, the EAEU can be considered as ’less natural’ (more ‘political’) than its Southern 
American counterpart. 
In addition, our method generates a rich set of suggestive results that can form the basis 
of further in-depth (intra-block) case studies. While discussing these results in detail for all the 
CUs would clearly go beyond the scope of this paper, the following provides a list of some 
interesting findings that emerge from our analysis. 
- Belarus is a member of EAEU but, according to our results, appears to belong rather to 
the RIC with minimum distance to the EU (step 186), which is interesting from a 
geopolitical perspective. 
- There is proximity between Colombia and Venezuela, although the latter is no longer a 
member of CAN, which points to the political character of its withdrawal. It could also 
be further analyzed to what extent the detected proximity between Venezuela (and 
Colombia) and the Caribbean is the result of Venezuela’s external strategy. 
- Belgium’s proximity to the UK, which is shown by the fact that Belgium joins a RIC 
with the UK before it joins the RIC with its other neighbors, points to its vulnerability 
in light of Brexit. 
- The fact that Nigeria joins ECOWAS at a relative late step (189) could be linked to the 
fact that it is not playing a strong role as regional leader. 
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We will not develop these cases further here. Rather, we simply point out the demonstrated 




The literature on optimum currency areas investigates which groups of countries are expected 
to benefit the most from forming a common currency area. In a similar way, we investigate 
which groups of countries are expected to benefit the most from regional trade integration. This 
way, we also shed new light on the concept of ‘natural markets’. Specifically, we argue that a 
machine-learning approach constitutes a valuable complementary tool to existing gravity-type 
econometric approaches to the evaluation of trade agreements. 
To illustrate the intuition and usefulness of the proposed approach, we apply our method 
to the set of customs unions as notified to the WTO. The obtained results allow for an analysis 
at two levels. First, the results can be used for inter-block comparisons, assessing the relative 
extent to which existing custom unions emerge ‘naturally’ from the clustering algorithm, and 
therefore respond to an economic logic, or whether, on the contrary, they respond more to a 
political logic. In our application, MERCOSUR is closest to the former case, the EAEU closest 
to the latter. In addition, the method generates a rich set of results that can form the basis of 
intra-block case studies. A more detailed analysis along this line is left to future research. 
In this paper, we focus on a method that can be used to evaluate the (sub-)optimality of 
non-overlapping regional arrangements in a cross-section of countries. Future work may find 
it useful to develop this approach further to also capture the dynamics of regional integration 
clusters over time, and to allow for evaluating overlapping arrangements such as FTAs. 
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Figure A1: Tree Graph Showing Land and Maritime Borders 
 
 
 
 
